Attention may be biased towards faces but a face advantage may be linked to the upright orientation of a face. Three experiments, employing a flanker and a cuing paradigm, investigated effects of face orientation, perceptual load and allocation of attention. Experiment 1 demonstrated that, irrespective of load, attention is biased towards upright face distractors while inverted face distractors are easy to ignore. Experiment 2 verified that inverted face distractors can interfere provided that they are attended to volitionally, likely because the volitional allocation of attention promotes face processing and gender classification (Experiment 3).
Introduction
Faces may attract more attention than other stimuli, although specific circumstances matter (see Palermo & Rhodes, 2007 for a review). An attentional preference for faces is reasonable, considering the social and biological importance of faces, but the exact conditions under which it occurs are not yet completely clear. Studies like the work by Lavie, Ro, and Russell (2003) suggested that faces are impossible to ignore and that face processing may be mandatory. In their study, participants searched for a name among one, two, four, or six letter strings, which were presented in the center of a display and indicated by key press whether the name was the name of a politician or a pop star. The central stimuli were flanked by peripheral famous faces of politicians or pop stars (Experiment 1), which had to be ignored. The flanking distractor faces could either be the face of the person named (congruent condition) or the face of a person from the opposite category (incongruent condition). The results showed that participants were slower to respond in the incongruent condition, providing evidence that the distractor faces were processed and not ignored. Crucially though, the distractor faces were also processed when the perceptual load in the center was high, i.e., six letter strings or even eight letter strings were shown (Experiment 3). At such a high load other meaningful non-face distractors such as fruits or musical instruments are typically not attended to (Experiments 2 and 4), in line with the perceptual load theory of attention (Lavie, 1995 (Lavie, , 2000 .
According to this theory, distractors should not have an effect because with high perceptual load, e.g., when many relevant stimuli are shown, the capacity for the perception of stimuli should be exhausted and the perception of distractors should be prevented. When, on the contrary, the perceptual load is low, e.g., when only one or very few relevant stimuli are shown, spare attentional capacity 'leaks to' the distractors, resulting in attention to and the perception of the distractors. The finding that face distractors were processed even at high perceptual load suggests that faces might always be prioritized irrespective of the perceptual load or their relevance for the task at hand, in line with their high biological and human significance.
The special role of faces is in line with further research that shows that the allocation of attention is biased towards faces and that irrelevant distractor faces are hard to ignore (Bindemann, Burton, & Jenkins, 2005; Jenkins, Burton, & Ellis, 2002; Langton, Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008; Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001; Young, Ellis, Flude, McWeeny, & Hay, 1986) . For example, Ro et al. (2001) showed preferential allocation of attention to faces in a change detection task, in which one of six upright stimuli containing a face and other objects (e.g., musical instruments, food, plants) could change. For instance, a face was replaced by another face. Participants were faster and more accurate to detect changed faces than changed objects, showing a clear face advantage. However, when only one stimulus was presented at a time (Experiment 2a) the face advantage disappeared. Based on these findings the authors suggest that a situation of high perceptual load, in which competition for attention occurs, is crucial for a face advantage to arise. This finding is in line with Lavie et al. (2003) , even though they used a different paradigm, because in their study the difference between face and object stimuli in terms of a congruency effect for faces but not objects occurred in high load conditions. 0042-6989/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2011. 05.007 Interestingly, in the Ro et al. (2001) study the preferential allocation of attention to faces was abolished when six stimuli were shown in inverted orientation (Experiment 2b). As competition for attention should also occur within a six-item-display of inverted stimuli, the absence of a face advantage indicates that a competition situation may not be sufficient for a face advantage. The orientation in which the face is shown may also be important. A study by Langton et al. (2008) , using a visual search task, is pointing in the same direction. Participants searched for a butterfly among six distractor stimuli. When one of the distractors was a face, search was significantly slowed. But this effect only occurred when the stimuli were shown upright. With inverted stimuli search times were not affected by the presence of an inverted face, indicating that higher level representations of faces produced the effect. These findings from different studies using different paradigms and tasks suggest two conclusions. First, for the allocation of attention and attentional resources to be biased towards faces it is not sufficient that a stimulus is a face and that it is presented in a competition situation but that it also is presented in upright orientation. Second, inverted faces, albeit being faces and thus socially and behaviorally relevant stimuli, do not appear to attract more allocation of attention than objects.
However, a recent study by Bindemann and Burton (2008) sheds doubt on both conclusions. They showed that more attention was allocated to inverted faces than objects, in fact as much as to upright faces. It was investigated how face inversion affects the allocation of attention to faces in a cuing paradigm. Faces and/or objects were shown to the left and right of central fixation, followed by a target (a gray square) at one of the two locations. Targets were responded to faster at the location of an inverted face compared to an inverted object (Experiment 1). This effect shows that more attention was allocated to inverted faces than to inverted objects. In further experiments inverted faces and upright faces were presented together. Upright faces did not attract more attention than inverted faces (Experiment 2) because the response times to targets appearing at the location of upright faces were not faster. Experiment 3 ruled out that the obtained effects were merely due to difficulties to distinguish upright and inverted faces. Thus, even though observers could distinguish the faces well, it was not more likely that attention was allocated to upright faces. The authors concluded that a face advantage in competition for attention is not affected by inversion.
There is thus conflicting evidence regarding the role of the orientation of a face and a preferential allocation of attention to faces. Methodological differences between previous studies may be important. In the studies by Ro et al. (2001) and Langton et al. (2008) an array of six to seven stimuli was shown, the face or inverted face was just one out of these stimuli and the participants had to perform a task that required them to distinguish the stimuli from each other. Thus, the perceptual load was high. On the other hand, Bindemann and Burton (2008) showed only two stimuli at a time and the task did not require participants to distinguish the faces from other classes of stimuli but to respond to the target stimulus following the face presentation (Experiments 1 and 2). Thus, the perceptual load was low. It is possible that attention allocated to inverted and upright faces may not differ when perceptual load is low but that an advantage for upright faces is found when perceptual load is high. Previous studies either included conditions of low vs. high load and upright faces Ro et al., 2001) , or compared processing of upright and inverted faces under either low load (Bindemann & Burton, 2008) or high load (Langton et al., 2008; Ro et al., 2001) . Thus, with the motivation to further examine under which conditions the allocation of attention may be biased towards faces and whether attention enhances the processing of inverted faces we manipulated load, face orientation and the allocation of attention in the present experiments.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 fully crossed the two factors perceptual load and face orientation and investigated whether attention is biased towards upright and inverted faces under low and under high load to a comparable degree. Interference effects of upright and inverted faces were assessed under varying load in a flanker paradigm similar to Lavie et al. (2003) . Based on the previous work outlined in the introduction, it is expected that upright and inverted faces would both attract attention and lead to congruency effects under low load but that under high load only upright faces would interfere.
Material and methods

Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate university students (25 female, 7 male; ages 18-22) gave informed consent and received course credit for taking part in the study. Sixteen participants took part in Condition 'Upright' and 16 participants took part in Condition 'Inverted'. All had normal or corrected vision. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure
The procedure of the experiment was modeled after the study by Lavie et al. (2003) . At the beginning of each trial a central fixation cross (0.5°Â 0.5°) was shown for 500 ms, followed by the presentation of a central array of letter strings, consisting of a name of an actor or actress and either one, three or five additional nonword letter strings (4-5°in length by 1.2°, 2.5°or 3.8°in height, depending on set size). To the left or right of the central array (3.5°dis-tance between inner edge of the picture and the central array) a grayscale picture (3.15°Â 4.55°) of a smiling male or female actor/actress (one out of six male and six female pictures; front view) was presented. The central array and distractor were presented until participants responded.
1 Like established in previous studies (i.e., Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2003; Lavie et al., 2003 ) the distractor could either be the face of the person named (congruent condition) or the face of a person from the opposite category (incongruent condition, see Fig. 1 ). In one condition the face distractor was presented upright, in the other condition inverted. The location of the distractor and its gender were equally frequent and randomized. The same stimuli were used and the same procedure followed for both conditions so that potentially different results between the conditions would not be due to specifics of the stimuli used. Using the same stimuli also necessitated that face orientation was manipulated between subjects. Each condition consisted of 432 trials, preceded by 29 practice trials. The experiment was run with Superlab (Cedrus) software. Participants were provided with written instructions, which informed them to find the name in the center of the screen and to indicate whether it belongs to a man or a woman by pressing one of two respective response buttons on the keyboard ('Q' for 'woman' and 'P' for 'man'). The reason for using a gender classification task was to assess whether the effects reported by Lavie et al. (2003) for upright faces would be replicated with a different type of task. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible 1 Following the procedure established by Lavie et al. (2003) we showed stimuli until response. It could be argued that this could allow serial processing of the target words and distractor faces. However, as will be shown in the results section for Experiment 1, congruency effects occurred for upright but not inverted faces, suggesting that attention was allocated to upright faces. Nevertheless, overall RT did not differ between orientation conditions, i.e., was not longer for upright faces, not in line with the idea that target and distractor were processed serially when congruency effects occurred. and to ignore the irrelevant peripheral distractors. Example displays are shown in Fig. 1 .
Results
Trials with reaction times (RT) below 200 ms and above two standard deviations (SD) of the mean of a given participant were treated as outliers and removed before data analysis. In a next step, mean RT of correct responses were calculated for each participant and submitted to an ANOVA with the within-factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6) and the between-factor orientation (upright vs. inverted).
The ANOVA returned significant main effects of set size and congruency as well as an interaction between congruency Â orientation. Reaction time increased with set size, F(2, 60) = 692.6, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.958, showing that perceptual load was modulated effectively. With respect to a congruency effect, participants responded more slowly in incongruent compared to congruent trials, Error rates were low (3-7%) and an ANOVA with the within-factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6) and the between-factor orientation (upright vs. inverted) did not return any significant effects on error rates.
Discussion
The results for upright faces replicate Lavie et al. (2003) and extend their results to a gender classification task, showing congruency effects regardless of perceptual load.
2 The congruency effects are also in line with Bindemann et al. (2005) who showed interference effects of distractor faces on name categorization in a gender classification task.
In accordance with the general expectation, the congruency effects differed between upright and inverted faces. Surprisingly though, inverted faces did not produce any congruency effect at all, not even under low load. The lack of a congruency effect for inverted faces cannot be explained by low-level factors such as complexity, brightness, contrast and configural properties because inverted faces are identical to upright faces with respect to these factors (Valentine, 1988) . A potential explanation for the lack of a congruency effect may be that upright faces do not require attention to be processed but inverted faces do. However, if this was the case then interference effects should occur for inverted faces at least with low perceptual load because under low load attention should 'spill over' to the distractor. However, no interference effects were found for inverted faces at low load.
The finding that inverted faces would not attract attention under low perceptual load is also surprising, considering that Bindemann and have shown that inverted faces can attract attention. However, the discrepancy between the present finding and their study can be explained by vast differences between the experimental procedures. First, in the study by Bindemann and Burton (2008) a gray square had to be detected and in the present experiment gender classification was required. If attention is also biased towards inverted faces then the allocated attentional resources may be sufficient to promote the detection of simple stimuli but not for stimulus discrimination. Also, in the Bindemann and Burton (2008) study the two cues, e.g., upright face/inverted face, competed with each other but did not compete with the target stimulus that was shown after the cue. It is thus possible that when two faces (upright and inverted) are shown together, that attention may be allocated to both stimuli. In the 2 As part of another set of experiments, we used the same procedure and set sizes as here but used upright objects (fruit and musical instruments) as flanker and obtained, consistent with the literature, significant main effects of congruency, F(1, 8) = 9.2, p < 0.02, and set size, F(2, 16) = 210.4, p < 0.001, as well as an interaction between set size and congruency, F(1, 16) = 3.9, p < 0.05. Object flankers interfered significantly at a set size of two, t(8) = 3.1, p < 0.02, showed a trend at set size four, t(8) = 2.2, p = 0.06, and showed no congruency effect at set size six, t(8) = 0.05, p = 0.97. These results underline the fact that the manipulation of perceptual load was effective and an absence of an interaction between congruency Â set size for upright face stimuli is not due to methodological reasons.
present experiment the face distractors competed with the letter strings and importantly, participants were instructed to ignore the distractor faces and to focus their attention on the centrally presented items. In Bindemann and Burton's study the faces were used as nonpredictive peripheral cues (Experiments 1 and 2) that appeared at a location where a target item could appear. Participants did not receive instructions with respect to the cues, thus, they were not told to ignore them. And importantly, because the target could appear at the locations where the cues were shown, the allocation of attention to those locations is functional and useful. Considering these differences between the studies, it is very possible that a lack of a congruency effect for inverted faces in the present experiment signifies that inverted faces are easy to ignore when participants try to do so. However, before accepting this explanation, an alternative explanation should be considered, namely, that it could also be the case that inverted faces are in fact attended to but simply do not produce congruency effects in the present paradigm. The goal of Experiment 2 was to test this hypothesis.
Experiment 2
To test whether inverted faces can lead to congruency effects at all in the present paradigm and whether no congruency effects occurred for inverted faces in Experiment 1 because participants successfully ignored the inverted face distractors, participants were now explicitly instructed to allocate attention to the distractor faces. To motivate them to do so, they were informed that they would have to complete a simple face recognition task after the initial experiment. If the lack of a congruency effect for inverted faces in Experiment 1 is unrelated to the allocation of attention, i.e., if inverted faces do in general not lead to congruency effects in this paradigm, then no congruency effect should be observed in the present experiment either. If the allocation of attention does mediate congruency effects for inverted faces though, then a congruency effect with slower/less accurate responses should occur for inverted as well as upright face stimuli.
Material and methods
Participants
Twenty-three undergraduate university students (12 female, 11 male; ages 18-22) gave informed consent and received course credit for taking part in the study. Eleven participants took part in Condition 'Upright' and 12 participants took part in Condition 'Inverted'. All had normal or corrected vision. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure
The experiment consisted of 288 trials. The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with the only exception that participants were instructed to pay attention to the distractor faces. They were informed that at the end of the experiment they would be asked some questions about the pictures. To fulfil this expectation, participants completed eight trials of a face recognition task after the experiment. On each trial of this additional task, a face of a man or woman who had been presented before or not was shown in upright or inverted orientation and participants had to indicate whether this person's picture had been shown during the experiment and to respond by button press. As the purpose of this test was only to fulfil the expectation of a further test and contained only very few trials, it will not be considered further.
Results
Trials with RT below 200 ms or above two SD of the mean of a given participant were considered as outliers and removed. Mean RT of correct responses was calculated for each participant and submitted to an ANOVA with the within-factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6) Error rates were low (2-6%) and an ANOVA with the within-factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6) and the between-factor orientation (upright vs. inverted) returned only a marginally significant effect for set size, F(2, 42) = 3.2, with the finding that a congruency effect was found in Experiment 2 but not Experiment 1. Set size showed a significant main effect, 
Discussion
The results are unequivocal. A congruency effect occurred for upright and for inverted faces, showing that inverted faces can produce congruency effects in the present paradigm. Thus, the results rule out the concern that inverted faces, in general, do not produce congruency effects. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 and 2, it is apparent that the volitional allocation of attention was critical for congruency effects to occur for inverted faces.
Interestingly, the congruency effects for upright and inverted faces in Experiment 2 were of the same extent. Thus, although inverted faces are typically harder to recognize (Valentine, 1988) , the gender of the faces must have been recognized sufficiently in the inverted condition in order to produce effects. In fact, distractor interference and resulting congruency effects necessitate the extraction of gender-related information from the peripheral faces. Because congruency effects occurred in Experiment 2 but not Experiment 1, it seems to be important that attention is allocated to an inverted face in order for the gender to be processed and classified.
The comparison between experiments revealed that for upright faces the congruency effect did not grow larger. This finding may show that attention biased towards the upright face distractors in Experiment 1 was sufficient to process the faces to the extent that the gender of the face interfered and further allocation of volitional attention is not required and does not enhance congruency effects for upright faces.
The comparison between experiments also showed that participants responded more slowly in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. This outcome is not surprising, considering that in addition to judging the centrally presented name a second task ('pay attention to the face') was instructed. However, it could be argued that because it took participants more time to provide the response in Experiment 2, this extra time may have supported processing of the inverted faces and hence gender classification. While time allocated to stimuli may well go hand in hand with more accurate processing, it has to be considered that, as in the study by Lavie et al. (2003) , in both experiments the stimuli were presented until participants responded. Thus, participants were free to take more time in Experiment 1 as well and to process the inverted faces. However, it appears that they did not do so but succeeded to ignore them.
3
In sum, Experiment 2 showed that inverted face distractors can lead to congruency effects, provided that attention is volitionally allocated to them. One way in which the volitional allocation of attention may mediate congruency effects with inverted face distractors is by facilitating the processing of inverted faces and hence facilitating gender classification. Attention serves to enhance processing of stimuli and this has been shown for upright faces using cuing procedures (Esterman et al., 2008; Landau, Esterman, Robertson, Bentin, & Prinzmetal, 2007) . To assess whether this is true for inverted faces as well and whether the allocation of attention promotes gender classification of inverted faces, and hence could have promoted congruency effects in Experiment 2, is the goal of Experiment 3. Experiment 3 was conducted based on the outcome of Experiment 2.
Experiment 3
One prototypical paradigm to investigate the effects of volitional attention is the cuing paradigm (e.g., Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984) , in which participants are provided with a cue that predicts the location of an upcoming target stimulus. Participants are encouraged to expect the target at the cued location and to strategically and volitionally direct their attention following the cue. Typically, participants are faster to respond to the target when it appears at the cued location, indicating that the allocation of attention facilitated the task-at-hand. If attention had no impact, no cuing effect should be observed.
Studies applying the cuing paradigm have shown that the allocation of attention improved the processing of upright face targets. For instance, in the experiments by Esterman et al. (2008) and Landau et al. (2007) the discrimination of upright faces was faster when the face appeared at the cued compared to the noncued location. The obtained cuing effect reflects that the allocation of attention on the stimulus face was beneficial. Landau et al. (2007) showed that the cuing benefit was larger when attention was directed volitionally by cues that predict the target location compared to a condition in which attention was directed only involuntarily by cues that are nonpredictive of target location, in agreement with a wealth of cuing studies which showed larger cuing effects with predictive compared to nonpredictive cues using other targets (e.g., Olk, Cameron, & Kingstone, 2008; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006) . Imaging studies are in line with such findings as well and have shown larger responses in the fusiform face area (FFA) when faces are attended compared to unattended (e.g., Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998) , in particular when attention is directed voluntarily (Esterman et al., 2008 ). An enhanced response in the FFA can be interpreted as perceptual enhancement of the stimuli, suggesting that the allocation of attention on the stimuli supports their processing.
It is undisputed that inverted faces are harder to identify than upright faces, possibly because inversion affects the configural processing of faces (Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000 ; for a review see Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002) and may produce a subtle but consistent shift in observers' spatial-sampling strategies (Sekuler, Gaspar, Gold, & Bennett, 2004) . Generally, it has also been shown that it takes longer to categorize inverted than upright faces (Donnelly, Humphreys, & Sawyer, 1994) and this finding also applies to gender classification tasks (Aguado, Garcia-Gutierrez, & Serrano-Pedraza, 2009; Sergent & Corballis, 1989) . It has been proposed that the eye-eyebrow region is the most important part for gender discrimination (Burton, Bruce, & Dench, 1993; Dupuis-Roy, Fortin, Fiset, & Gosselin, 2009) and it is possible that inversion may hinder the processing of such an area. As attention facilitates processing, we propose that attention may also facilitate the processing of inverted faces and hence gender classification of inverted faces.
Consequently, the goal of Experiment 3 was to test whether the volitional allocation of attention would promote processing of inverted faces and thereby facilitate gender classification. To this end, we used a different paradigm than in the first two experiments and switched to the cuing paradigm. Participants were cued with predictive cues and encouraged to volitionally shift their attention in the direction of the cue before the gender classification 3 To further investigate this issue, we determined the six fastest and the six slowest participants in the inverted face condition in Experiment 2 and compared their results. Importantly, the 'fast' group was significantly faster than the 'slow' group, F(1, 10) = 24.95, p < 0.002. The RT difference between the 'fast' and 'slow' group was on average 213 ms. The typical main effects of congruency, F(1, 10) = 8.4, p < 0.02, and of set size, F(1, 20) = 194.1, p < 0.001, were confirmed. However, none of the interactions reached significance, and importantly, the interaction between congruency Â speed was thus not significant, p = .46. This result indicates that longer RTs are not associated with larger congruency effects. of a face target. In the 'Cuing' Condition, participants were informed that in most trials the to be judged face would appear at the cued location. It was expected that gender classification of inverted faces would be faster and more accurate when the face appeared at a cued compared to a noncued location. In order to place the experiment in the context of previously reported cuing effects for faces and to ensure that any potential absence of cuing effects for inverted faces (although unexpected) would not be due to methodological aspects, we also included trials in which upright faces were used as targets. For upright face targets, cuing effects are expected, in line with previous work. Whether cuing would facilitate face processing to the same extent for upright and inverted faces was an open question. On the one hand, it could be expected that inverted faces may benefit more from cues than upright faces because they are harder to process and classify. Also, responses to inverted faces may be given more slowly. Alternatively, it is possible that the effects between upright and inverted faces do not differ. In a control condition ('No cue') participants simply judged the gender of a peripherally presented face to establish that gender classification of the presented stimuli is slower and less accurate for inverted faces.
Material and methods
Participants
Thirty undergraduate university students (21 female, 9 male; ages 18-22) gave informed consent and received course credit for taking part in the study. Fifteen participants took part in Condition 'Cuing' and 15 participants took part in Condition 'No cue'. All had normal or corrected vision. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure
The experiment consisted of two conditions. In both conditions, the 'No Cue' and the 'Cuing' condition, a horizontal line (2.5°) was presented in the center of the screen and participants were instructed to fixate this line throughout a trial. After 1000 ms, in the 'No Cue' condition a picture of a face (5.8°Â 6.7°) was added and presented 2°to the left or to the right of the line, in randomized order. The pictures contained photographs of unfamiliar female and male faces as classification of familiar faces may prove too easy for the purpose of the present experiment. Further, images were cut to conceal most of the hair. Participants were instructed to determine the gender of the presented person and to press one of two designated response keys, labeled with 'WOMAN' or 'MAN' on a Cedrus RB-530 response box as fast as possible. The display was presented for 1000 ms.
In the 'Cuing' condition the central horizontal line was changed into an arrow cue by adding fins to both sides of the line. The cue pointed in the direction at which the picture was going to appear (valid cue) in 66% of the trials and in the opposite direction (invalid cue) in 33% of the trials. As effects of voluntary orienting increase with the time between cue and target, we chose a reasonably long stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 800 ms to allow sufficient time to allocate attention voluntarily. Thus, after 800 ms the same pictures as in the 'No Cue' condition were shown to the left or right of the arrow, in randomized order, for a further 1000 ms. Participants were informed of cue validity and encouraged to use the cue.
Each condition, 'No Cue' and 'Cuing', consisted of two blocks of 240 trials each, preceded by 12 practice trials. In one of the blocks participants were presented with upright faces, in the other block with inverted faces, with half of the participants starting with upright and half with inverted faces. For each block, the stimuli were selected from a pool of twenty female and twenty male faces. The faces used in both blocks differed. Example displays and procedure are illustrated in Fig. 4. 
Results
Trials with RT below 200 ms or above two SD of the mean of each given participant were removed.
In the 'No cue' condition mean RT of correct responses was compared between trials with upright and trials with inverted faces and showed that responses were given significantly faster in the upright condition, t(14) = 6.71, p < .001, d = 1.73. The comparison between error rates in trials with upright (2.9%) and inverted faces (6.4%) also showed an effect of orientation, with fewer errors when faces were presented upright, t(14) = 4.8, p < .001, d = 1.23.
Mean RT of correct responses in the 'Cuing' condition were compared with an ANOVA with the within-factors orientation (upright vs. inverted) and cue validity (valid vs. invalid). The ANOVA returned significant main effects of orientation and of validity. Gender was classified faster for upright faces, F(1, 14) = 65.9, p < .001, The analysis of error rates for the 'Cuing' condition, considering orientation (upright vs. inverted) and cue validity (valid vs. invalid) , showed that faces were discriminated more accurately when shown upright (3%) than inverted (6.2%), F(1, 14) = 9.5, p < 0.01, g 2 p = 0.404. No further effects were significant. Error rates were generally relatively low. 
Discussion
The results in the 'No cue' condition established that participants were significantly slower and less accurate at judging gender for the inverted face stimuli used in the experiment, confirming that inverted faces are harder to classify than upright faces (Aguado et al., 2009; Sergent & Corballis, 1989) . The 'Cuing' condition supported this result. Here participants were also slower and less accurate to respond when an inverted face had to be judged.
For faces shown in both orientations, participants significantly benefitted from valid cues. The response was given faster when attention had initially been allocated towards the location at which a face stimulus was likely to appear. The cuing effects were of the same extent for upright and inverted faces, even though inverted faces are harder to classify, as indicated by slower response times. The experiment thus suggests that the allocation of attention promoted processing of inverted faces and facilitated gender classification, in line with imaging and electrophysiological studies (e.g., Eimer, 2000; Esterman et al., 2008; Wojciulik et al., 1998) . The finding of a cuing effect also for inverted faces suggests that in Experiment 2 the volitional directing of attention towards the inverted face likely facilitated processing and classification of faces and that in turn the inverted faces interfered with incongruent central targets. 4 In Experiment 1 no attention or possibly not enough attention was directed to the inverted face for gender classification.
General discussion
We conducted three experiments to investigate under which conditions attention may be biased towards faces and whether the allocation of attention enhances processing of inverted faces. A particular focus was on face orientation, perceptual load and the effect of the volitional allocation of attention.
Noticing the conflicting evidence whether attention is biased towards inverted faces like towards upright faces, we asked whether the consideration of perceptual load may resolve this issue. More specifically, in Experiment 1 we hypothesized that the orientation of a face may not matter when load is low, i.e., attention may be biased towards inverted faces as much as towards upright faces, but when perceptual load is high attention may only be allocated to upright faces. Experiment 1 did not confirm this hypothesis. When faces were shown upright, congruency effects occurred, in line with the literature. No congruency effects were observed for inverted faces, irrespective of load, suggesting that attention was not biased towards inverted faces and that it was in fact easy for participants to ignore faces when they are inverted.
5 Experiment 2 ruled out that this lack of congruency effects for inverted faces was due to an inability of inverted faces to produce congruency effects in the applied paradigm per se. When participants had to allocate attention to the faces in Experiment 2, significant congruency effects occurred also for inverted faces. Experiments 1 and 2 thus allow the conclusion that the orientation of a face clearly affects whether attention will be biased towards a face. In line with Lavie et al. (2003) upright faces were always prioritized, irrespective of the perceptual load. For inverted faces there was no direct evidence that participants attended to them, suggesting that they were easy to ignore, regardless of the load, in Experiment 1, thus inverting faces at least reduces attention-biasing power. This conclusion is consistent with a recent study by Devue, Laloyaux, Feyers, Theeuwes, and Bredart (2009) and also Gilchrist and Proske (2006) . Devue et al. (2009) showed that upright but not inverted face stimuli were more resistant to inattentional blindness. They interpret their findings as showing that upright faces are more likely to grab attention than other objects or inverted faces. Gilchrist and Proske (2006) examined eye movements towards and away from upright and inverted faces and showed that when participants had to look away from the peripheral face stimuli, i.e., make an antisaccade, they made less erroneous saccades towards a peripheral face stimulus when they had to look away from an inverted face than from an upright face. This may suggest that inverted faces attracted attention and the eyes to a lesser extent (even though participants still had to attend to the inverted face because it was task-relevant as the task was to look away from the stimulus). Importantly, our results do not need to imply that inverted faces will never attract attention (see Bindemann & Burton, 2008) . But when participants are instructed to ignore inverted faces, it is easier for them to do so than for upright faces.
Our finding that inverted faces were easy to ignore is also in line with Jenkins et al. (2003) . The basic task in their set of experiments was the classification of a centrally presented name of a pop star or a politician while ignoring a famous distractor face (depicting a pop star or a politician). In the different experiments and conditions either only one distractor face was present, or the distractor face together with either a phase-shifted face, an intact face, an inverted face or an object (Experiments 1-3). Interference effects by the famous face were reduced when another upright intact face was presented but not when the other stimuli, including an inverted face, served as additional distractors. The authors interpret their findings that face processing may be automatic when a single famous face is presented but that face processing is not completely capacity-free and the capacity limit may be face-specific. The study also suggests that upright faces may be strong competitors for attention. Such conclusions are in line with our findings.
The comparison between Experiments 1 and 2 shows that the allocation of attention is crucial to elicit congruency effects for inverted face distractors. A possible way in which the allocation of attention may achieve this is by enhancing processing of inverted faces. Experiment 3 thus went one step further and tested whether the allocation of attention to an inverted face will facilitate processing. The experiment confirmed that it is harder to classify the gender of an inverted than of an upright face, but that the allocation of attention facilitates processing of the inverted faces. This finding suggests that in Experiment 2 the allocation of attention also likely facilitated the processing of the faces and gender classification and hence congruency effects occurred also for inverted faces.
It had been shown before that attention facilitates processing of upright faces (e.g., Esterman et al., 2008) and our study now showed that this is true for inverted faces as well. A question that arises is why volitional attention did not further enhance congruency effects in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1, in particular considering that volitional attention does also support processing of upright faces, as indicated by cuing effects in Experiment 3. A likely explanation is that even though volitional attention promotes processing of upright faces, this enhanced processing is not required for congruency effects. In other words, the attention biased involuntarily towards upright faces is sufficient for gender classification. 4 Gender classification of the faces used in Experiments 1 and 2 was possibly easier than in Experiment 3 because in Experiment 3 unfamiliar faces were chosen. While it is theoretically possible that attention effects may be smaller for faces that are easier to classify, the results of Experiment 3 do not support this idea. Upright faces were clearly easier to classify because participants responded faster and more accurately than for inverted faces. The cuing effect was of the same extent in both orientation conditions, however. 5 The interpretation that inverted faces were easy to ignore does not imply per se that no attention/attentional resources at all were allocated to them. It remains possible that some attention was allocated to the inverted faces in Experiment 1, however, not sufficient to produce interference effects, and further work may wish to investigate whether inverting faces only reduces but not completely abolishes allocation of attention in the given paradigm.
Our Experiments 1 and 2 are the first ones that fully crossed the factors face orientation and perceptual load in a flanker task. Experiment 3 is the first one that used inverted faces as targets in a cuing task. Therefore, we consider our results as a first step in a series of further experiments that would be fostered by our research. 6 For instance, a question to be investigated could be whether inverted faces were easier to ignore because they are harder to process. In a future experiment upright flanker faces could be shown normally or degraded in order to manipulate how hard they are to process. A lack of or a reduced congruency effect in the degraded condition would indicate that difficulty of processing may be crucial. A further difference between upright and inverted faces may be that inverted faces are perceived as less ''meaningful'' and hence are easier to ignore. Testing this possibility will thus also be of interest.
In our Experiments 1 and 2, we used famous faces, in line with previous studies. However, it cannot be ruled out that the matching identity of the face stimulus and the name to be judged in congruent trials may play a role, e.g., whether it promotes the congruency effect for upright faces. To this end, Experiments 1 and 2 could be repeated using unfamiliar faces.
In our Experiments 1 and 2 we showed upright and inverted faces between groups of participants. Our reasons for doing so were to show all participants exactly the same stimuli for upright and inverted faces to rule out that different results for upright and inverted faces may be due to differences in the stimuli rather than their orientation. This necessitated to test between groups. As there is no reason to believe that there was any fundamental difference between the groups for processing faces as both groups were of a similar age and background, we believe that our methodology is warranted, also in light of past studies that have compared performance between groups and experiments (e.g., Lavie et al., 2003) . Further, we aimed at avoiding any potential order effects between upright and inverted trials, e.g., participants who had seen a given face in upright orientation would then process the face differently when seen inverted and vice versa. However, it would be an interesting research question whether randomizing trials with upright and inverted face distractors would affect how upright faces attract attention and how easily inverted faces are ignored and whether any effects would interact with load. On the one hand, it could be expected that inverted faces should still be easier to ignore when randomized with upright faces. On the other hand, inter-trial effects could occur. For instance, it could be possible that an upright face on trial N may interfere less when an inverted face was shown on the previous trial N À 1, and similarly, an upright face on trial N À 1 may bias attention to an inverted face on trial N.
Conclusions
Our study allows us to conclude that attention is biased towards faces, irrespective of perceptual load, but that face orientation is critical. Inverted faces are easier to ignore when participants try to do so, irrespective of perceptual load. Furthermore, the allocation of attention enhances face processing and gender classification to the same extent for upright and inverted faces.
